Cold War fears resurface as Iran’s reach grows and Britain admits it has no independent shield

PEMBROKESHIRE has long been considered a strategic target — and during the Cold War, the county’s energy infrastructure and Atlantic access placed it firmly on the radar of military planners.

Today, those same strengths are raising uncomfortable questions once again.

As tensions rise following Iran’s attempted strike on a UK–US base at Diego Garcia on Saturday (March 21), the debate has shifted sharply: not whether Britain is under immediate threat — but whether it would be protected if that ever changed.

Strategic target

Milford Haven is home to some of the UK’s most critical energy assets, including major LNG terminals and oil infrastructure that supply a significant share of the nation’s gas.

In strategic terms, such facilities would rank among the most valuable economic targets in any high-level conflict.

For many in Pembrokeshire, that reality is nothing new. During the Cold War, the area was widely regarded as a potential target due to its importance to Britain’s energy security.

Lessons from Diego Garcia

The attempted strike on Diego Garcia has become a defining moment in the current crisis.

The joint UK–US base is a heavily defended military installation, supported by advanced radar systems and US naval assets. Reports indicate that one of the incoming missiles was intercepted before it could reach its target, while another failed.

But that success raises a more troubling question.

If a missile can be intercepted over a fortified base in the Indian Ocean, what happens when the target is a civilian energy hub in west Wales?

No shield over Britain

The UK has no dedicated system to intercept long-range ballistic missiles over its own territory.

While RAF Fylingdales provides early warning and tracking, it cannot stop an incoming threat.

Britain’s air defence network is designed to deal with aircraft, drones and cruise missiles — not high-speed ballistic weapons travelling through space.

In practical terms, if a missile were ever heading toward a location such as Milford Haven, there is no British-operated system that could reliably stop it at the last moment.

Reliance on the United States

Instead, any interception attempt would fall to the United States and wider NATO systems.

These include:

• Aegis Ashore missile defence bases in Eastern Europe
• US Navy warships equipped with SM-3 interceptors
• Integrated NATO tracking and command networks

These systems are capable of striking a missile in space during its midcourse phase — but only if the missile passes within range.

If it does not, there may be no interception at all.

Even when an attempt is made, success is not guaranteed. Analysts estimate that such systems have a probability of success of between 50 and 80 per cent under test conditions, meaning multiple interceptors are often fired at a single target to improve the odds.

Europe now “within range”

The debate has intensified following warnings from Israel that Iran’s latest missiles could reach far beyond the Middle East.

Israeli officials have claimed that the system used in the Diego Garcia attempt was a two-stage ballistic missile with a range of around 4,000 km — potentially placing parts of Europe within reach.

Cities such as London, Paris and Berlin have been cited as falling within the outer limits of that range, although experts stress that range on paper does not necessarily translate into reliable, repeatable strike capability.

Experts divided

Defence analysts remain split.

Some say the attempted long-range strike marks a clear step forward in Iran’s capabilities, moving the threat from theoretical to credible.

Others caution that Iran’s operational missile arsenal has historically been limited to around 2,000 km, suggesting that any longer-range capability may still be experimental rather than deployable.

UK Government response

Ministers have sought to calm fears, insisting there is no current evidence that Iran has either the intent or the capability to strike the UK mainland.

At the same time, the government has condemned Iran’s actions as “reckless” and emphasised that Britain will work with allies to protect its interests.

That response reflects a broader reality.

Deterrence, not defence

Britain’s primary protection is not interception — it is deterrence.

Any successful strike on UK soil would almost certainly trigger a major NATO response, making such an attack extraordinarily risky for any adversary.

But deterrence does not eliminate vulnerability.

The bottom line

Pembrokeshire’s strategic importance has not changed — but the conversation around long-range threats has.

The UK can detect a missile. It can track it. It can coordinate with allies and attempt an interception at distance.

But when it comes to stopping it over Britain itself, there is no independent shield — only reliance on US and NATO systems being in the right place at the right time.

For communities built around critical infrastructure like Milford Haven, that raises a stark and uncomfortable question:

If the unthinkable ever became reality, who — if anyone — would be able to stop it?

Reliance on US interceptors leaves gaps as Iran’s reach grows

BRITAIN would struggle to defend itself against a long-range ballistic missile attack and would instead rely heavily on American systems based in Eastern Europe and at sea — with no guarantee of success.

That is the stark reality emerging after Iran’s attempted strike on a UK–US base at Diego Garcia on Saturday (March 21), a move that caught many world leaders off guard and marked a significant escalation in capability.

Concerns are further heightened by Iran’s development of larger space launch vehicles, including the Simorgh, Zuljanah, Ghaem-100 and Qased systems, which on paper demonstrate ranges of between 2,200 km and up to 6,000 km, with payload capacities of up to 1,000 kg. While these rockets are officially designed to place satellites into orbit rather than deliver warheads, they use the same multi-stage technology and propulsion systems found in long-range ballistic missiles. Defence analysts have long warned that such programmes provide a clear pathway to intercontinental strike capability, raising the prospect that parts of Europe — and potentially even the UK — could fall within reach if these technologies are adapted for military use.

No UK shield over Britain

The UK has no dedicated system to shoot down long-range ballistic missiles over its own territory.

While RAF Fylingdales provides early warning and tracking, it cannot intercept incoming threats. Britain’s air defence network — including RAF jets and ground systems — is designed for aircraft, drones and cruise missiles, not high-speed ballistic weapons.

In simple terms, if a missile were heading toward a target such as Milford Haven’s energy facilities, there is no British-operated system that could reliably stop it at the last moment.

America would have to act

Instead, any interception attempt would fall to the United States.

Key assets include:

• Aegis Ashore missile defence bases in Romania and Poland
• US Navy warships equipped with SM-3 interceptors
• Wider NATO tracking and coordination systems

These systems are capable of striking a missile in space during its midcourse phase, long before it reaches the UK.

But there is a crucial limitation: they can only engage if the missile passes within range of those systems.

If the trajectory falls outside that envelope — or if no US ship is positioned correctly — there may be no interception at all.

A probability, not protection

Even when an intercept is attempted, success is far from certain.

Testing data for the SM-3 system suggests success rates of roughly 50 to 80 per cent per engagement, depending on conditions. In practice, multiple interceptors are often fired at a single target to improve the odds.

That still leaves a significant margin for failure.

In a real-world scenario involving countermeasures, technical faults or multiple missiles, the chances of at least one getting through rise sharply.

Gaps in coverage

The NATO missile defence network is not a continuous shield.

It is a patchwork of coverage zones tied to specific systems:

• Romania and Poland provide fixed land-based interception capability
• US warships offer flexible but limited coverage depending on deployment

There is no permanent protective umbrella over the UK itself.

If a missile does not pass through one of those defended zones, Britain would effectively be relying on luck and geometry.

Deterrence, not defence

Ultimately, the UK’s primary protection is not interception — it is deterrence.

Any successful strike on British soil would almost certainly trigger a major NATO response, making such an attack extraordinarily risky for any adversary.

But deterrence does not equal defence.

A growing concern

Iran’s attempted long-range strike on Diego Garcia has shifted the debate sharply.

The use of a missile capable of travelling thousands of kilometres surprised many Western leaders, who had not expected Tehran to demonstrate that level of reach in the current crisis. Although one missile failed and another was intercepted, the incident has raised fresh questions about how far Iran’s capabilities have advanced.

For years, the idea of a missile threat to Europe — let alone Britain — was largely theoretical. Now, defence analysts are treating it as a credible future risk, even if capability remains limited today.

The bottom line

The UK can detect a missile, track it, and coordinate a response — but when it comes to actually stopping it, the country would be dependent on American systems operating at distance, with no certainty of success.

If a missile ever did get through, there would be little standing between it and its target.

And that is the uncomfortable truth behind the headlines.

CAMPAIGNERS opposing the proposed Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) project on the St Davids peninsula have accused the Ministry of Defence of attempting to push through associated infrastructure in separate stages in order to avoid proper planning scrutiny.

The group PARC Against DARC (Pembrokeshire Against Radar Campaign) claims the approach resembles a practice sometimes referred to as “salami slicing”, where elements of a large development are split into smaller projects and considered separately rather than as a single scheme.

Campaigners say several developments linked to the radar proposal appear to be progressing outside the main planning process.

“We haven’t come across a single person who doesn’t think the whole story behind the RDF aircraft tracker relocation proposal, the high-security undersea cable landing station, the Newgale bypass scheme and major power upgrades simply doesn’t add up,” the group said.

“After thirty-seven Senedd and Westminster politicians publicly opposed DARC, a petition gathered 18,000 signatures and demonstrations gained widespread attention online, the MOD now appears to be attempting to ‘salami slice’ the project and push it through piece by piece.”

Follow the DARC money

PARC claims documentation submitted as part of the MOD’s environmental screening request confirms that relocating an RDF aircraft tracker forms part of the wider DARC project.

Campaigners argue that although the relocation is described as operationally separate, it appears closely linked to the radar development.

“The MOD’s screening document acknowledges that relocating the RDF was part of DARC planning and suggests the work would be completed before construction begins,” campaigners said.

“This raises serious questions about why the relocation is being treated as an entirely separate development.”

They also claim the screening request does not assess the potential cumulative impact of radiofrequency radiation from both the relocated tracker and the proposed DARC radar installation.

Campaigners say they have identified more than four thousand scientific studies linking similar radiation exposure to health risks, including cancer, although regulators including the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) currently consider such installations safe within guideline limits.

Cable station raises further questions

Campaigners also point to a new undersea cable landing station being built close to the gates of Cawdor Barracks at Brawdy.

Although described as civilian infrastructure, PARC says the facility’s security measures — including fencing, razor wire and CCTV — have fuelled local speculation that it could support the radar project by carrying data from overseas.

The group notes that Brawdy previously hosted installations connected to the Cold War-era SOSUS submarine detection network.

“If these cables are intended to support DARC operations, then the infrastructure should be assessed alongside the radar project itself,” campaigners said.

Newgale bypass and power upgrades

The campaign group also suggests the long-planned Newgale bypass scheme could be indirectly connected to DARC, arguing that large-scale construction traffic would struggle to access the proposed radar site using existing rural roads.

They also say discussions between the MOD and the Pembrokeshire Coast National Park Authority suggest significant electricity supply upgrades may be required to power the radar installation.

Campaigners claim that neither the bypass nor potential power infrastructure has been fully assessed alongside the main DARC proposal.

Political issue ahead of Senedd election

With the Senedd election approaching, campaigners say opposition to the radar project could become a key political issue.

Both Plaid Cymru and the Wales Green Party have publicly opposed the proposal.

“Local communities feel this project has been pushed forward without transparency and without proper engagement,” campaigners said.

“With the Senedd election approaching, DARC is likely to become a major issue for voters across Pembrokeshire.”